Proceedings of the 17th Dutch Testing Day: Testing Evolvability by Stoelinga, Mariëlle & Timmer, Mark
 
 
 
 
Proceedings of the 
 
17th Dutch Testing Day 
 
Testing Evolvability 
 
 
 
 
Editors: Mariëlle Stoelinga and Mark Timmer 
 
November 29, 2011 
 
University of Twente, Enschede 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2  
Programme Committee 
Axel Belinfante (Universiteit Twente) 
Henk van Dam (Collis) 
Hans-Gerhard Gross (Technische Universiteit Delft) 
Bart-Jan de Leuw (Logica) 
Iris Pinkster (Professional Testing BV) 
Maurice Siteur (Capgemini) 
Mariëlle Stoelinga (Universiteit Twente) 
Jan Tretmans (ESI en Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) 
Tim Willemse (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven) 
 
 
Steering Committee 
Henk van Dam (Collis) 
Jan Tretmans (ESI en Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen) 
 
 
Organisation 
Mariëlle Stoelinga (Formal Methods & Tools, Universiteit Twente) 
Axel Belinfante (Formal Methods & Tools, Universiteit Twente) 
Mark Timmer (Formal Methods & Tools, Universiteit Twente) 
 
 
 
 
 
Publication details 
Proceedings of the 17th Dutch Testing Day  
Edited by Mariëlle Stoelinga and Mark Timmer 
 
Published: February 2012 
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands 
 
CTIT Workshop Proceedings Series WP12-01  
 
Centre for Telematics and Information Technology 
University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands 
 
ISSN 0929-0672 
 3  
Preface 
 
These are the post-proceedings of 17th Dutch Testing Day, held on the 29th of November 2011 
at the — recently completely renovated — campus of the University of Twente. These post-
proceedings cover a selection of the material presented during the Dutch Testing Day.  
 
For me personally, the synergy between academic and industrial testing activities is one of the 
most attractive aspects of the Dutch Testing Day: we have participants, speakers, and financial 
contributions from both worlds, fostering cross-fertilization and building bridges between them. 
It is widely known that industrial-academic partnership is a key driver to innovation and to 
remain at the competitive edge. 
 
Therefore, I would like to thank everybody who made the 17th Dutch Testing Day a success: 
First of all, many thanks go to all participants: without participants, no Testing Day. Also, I 
would like to thank everybody who submitted an abstract, giving the Programme Committee a 
hard job in selecting the 7 best abstracts for presentation. Moreover, we are very much indebted 
to our sponsors: CIMSOLUTIONS, SQUERIST, AESTIS KMG, the Institute for Software 
Quality, ASML, Valori, the Centre for Telematics and Information Technology, NWO, Improve 
Quality Services, Better Be, Professional Testing, Refis and Collis. Their financial contributions 
allow the participants to attend the Dutch Testing Day free of charge and show the importance 
of the topic. I am grateful to Rector Magnificus Ed Brinksma for opening the Testing Day, and 
invited speaker Kim Larsen for giving the keynote speech. 
 
Finally, I would very much like to thank the other members of the organizing team of the 17th 
Dutch Testing Day: Axel Belinfante, Joke Lammerink and Mark Timmer for their fantastic 
support.  
 
 
 
 
Mariëlle Stoelinga 
 
Formal Methods & Tools 
University of Twente  
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TOPAAS-model for software reliability analysis 
Ed Brandt 
Refis 
 
 
 
 
Rijkswaterstaat is introducing probabilistic management to storm surge barriers and other 
objects. A risk analysis is the centre of this approach. Software failure is an important 
component in this. Quantifying software failure using existing methods, however, appeared to 
be not feasible. In order to address this problem, a group of known experts in the field of 
software reliability engineering from industry and academia has developed a factor driven 
model called TOPAAS. This article explains the necessity of software failure quantification, the 
use of expert opinion, the basics of TOPAAS as a property driven model and the work still to be 
done. 
1. Introduction 
Rijkswaterstaat is the Dutch Directorate for Infrastructure and Water Management. It is a public 
body responsible for building and maintaining the country’s road and waterway infrastructure, 
including bridges, locks, weirs and movable storm surge barriers. A couple of years ago this 
public body introduced probabilistic management. A risk assessment is the centre of this 
approach. It gives direction to test intervals, maximal time to repair and modifications to the 
object. The ideal situation would be that Rijkswaterstaat provides different scenario’s, with 
different cost estimates, that each will result in a different quality level and that the government 
is able to make a political choice. 
 
Software plays an increasingly important role in these objects and systems. So to be able to 
quantify the risk of the entire system, quantification of software reliability is a necessity. 
Whereas for hardware reliability assessments and quantification is fairly common, for software 
it is not. Over the years several attempts have been made to introduce methods for this. In the 
next section some of these are discussed. 
2. Existing methods for reliability analysis 
Already in the early seventies of the previous century statistical models were described to 
predict the occurrence of failures in software. These Reliability Growth Models are based on the 
principle that the reliability of software grows when defects are found and fixed. This growth is 
not random but depends on properties of the system at hand. To determine an accurate failure 
probability, a statistically significant number of defects is required. With safety critical, high 
reliable systems as storm surge barriers, that appears to be a problem. When modules of those 
systems show many defects they are discarded all together. 
 
The Monte Carlo approach of random testing and comparing the results with the predicted 
outcome is also not practically feasible. It would take excessive testing effort in complex 
systems as storm surge barriers. And then there are methods that help to achieve reliable 
software, like formal methods or the use of Safety Integrity Levels (IEC 61508). These methods 
however cannot be used to guarantee or quantify reliability of existing software afterwards. 
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The overall conclusion for Rijkswaterstaat must be that there are no adequate or feasible 
methods available. In order to address this problem, a group of known experts in the field of 
software reliability engineering conceived a new method called TOPAAS. 
3. TOPAAS-model 
TOPAAS is short for Task Oriented Probability of Abnormalities Analysis for Software. It is a 
static approach to analysis of reliability. This means it does not involve actual usage of the 
system at hand as in reliability growth modelling. But in stead it evaluates the circumstances 
that influence reliability and quantifies these factors.  
 
Software failure in this approach is defined as the absence (for too long) of desired task 
execution, or the incorrect task execution, by a software module with respect to the mission of 
the overall system. Task execution is an individual action implemented in software that is 
observable on the outside (on a technical level) and that can be decided upon if it is performed 
correctly or incorrectly with respect to the overall mission of the system. A software module is 
then defined as a piece of software that is represented by a specific group of lines source code 
(or its graphical equivalent) with the following properties: 
§ A clear distinction can be made with respect to other pieces of code and there is clear 
separated functionality provided by the module that is required by the system; 
§ It exhibits observable behaviour with specific qualities (like timeliness, reliability, etc.); 
§ It isn’t useful (in the light of the failure analysis on system level) or possible to make a 
further decomposition. 
 
Applying TOPAAS starts with decomposing the system into software modules performing a 
Fault Tree Analysis. The probability of software failure of individual modules is then 
determined by investigating 15 factors divided into 5 dimensions. Answering the questions with 
every factor results in a failure probability per module in the FTA.  
 
From a mathematical point of view: 
§ factor driven model provides n factors Fi to determine failure probability P 
 
  P = PB  F1  F2  ...  Fn 
 
where 
o PB is the base failure rate (1 as a conservative default value, implying the 
assumption that software will fail if we cannot apply a reliability analysis method) 
o Fx is the impact of a specific factor based on a piece of knowledge 
 
TOPAAS contains the following 5 dimensions and, in total, 15 factors: 
  
§ Development process 
o Safety Integrity Level 
o Inspections 
o Design modifications 
o Maturity organisation 
o Knowledge and experience 
o Cooperation 
§ Product properties 
o Complexity 
o Size 
o Transparency architecture 
o Certified compiler 
§ Requirements  
o traceability 
§ Testing 
o techniques and coverage 
§ Operational use 
o Multi processor 
o Field data available 
o Monitoring 
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The combination of these factors expresses the combined expert opinions that determine the 
probability of failure. By using these underlying factors, simulating the experts, the accuracy of 
the estimates and the transparency of the process are hugely increased. An example of the factor 
“Test techniques and coverage” is shown below. 
 
 
 
Note that TOPAAS makes a distinction between systems developed targeting a Safety Integrity 
Level of 3 or 4 and others. When a system is not developed targeting a SIL and formal test 
techniques were used but with a low coverage, the failure probability will be decreased by a 
factor 10-1/2 (answer 4). But when SIL 3 or 4 was targeted the failure probability in that case will 
increase by a factor of 102/3! 
 
 
Depending on the 
outcome of the 
underlying factors 
the TOPAAS 
dimensions may 
influence the base 
failure rate as follows 
(diagram). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. To be done 
Version 2 of the theory behind the model is published within Rijkswaterstaat and its suppliers 
and is already applied in several projects. It is available, but only in Dutch yet 
(http://www.refis.nl/media/artikelen.php). Publication in international magazines is being 
prepared. The model has been tested on several reference projects and compared to other 
methods of reliability analysis, including expert opinion.  
 
It now needs further back up and calibration by statistical data and, based on that further review 
and referencing. Manuals and tools should be provided when broadening the access and usage. 
Also support of user forum and model maintenance should be organized.  
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A particular point of investigation is related to the crucial point of software module 
decomposition. Failure probability of modules in an FTA may interfere of influence each other. 
The correlation of modules in this respect needs further investigation resulting in guide lines for 
TOPAAS users. 
TOPAAS authors and reviewers  
Authors of the TOPAAS model are: Alessandro Di Bucchianico (TU/e), Jaap van Ekris (DNV), 
Jan-Friso Groote (TU/e), Wouter Geurts (Logica), Gerben Heslinga (Intermedion), Gea Kolk 
(Movares) and Ed Brandt (Refis). 
 
Reviewers of the TOPAAS model are: Sipke van Manen (Bouwdienst RWS), Harry van der 
Graaf (Bouwdienst RWS), Peter van Gestel (Delta Pi) and Piet de Groot (NRG). 
About the author 
Ed Brandt is working in information technology since 1982. He specialized in software testing 
since 1996 and founded Refis in 2003, specialized in reliability engineering and software 
metrics. He is one of the authors of the Topaas-method. Please contact edbrandt@refis.nl for 
more information. 
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Constructing Formal Models 
through Automata Learning 
Fides Aarts, Faranak Heidarian, and Frits Vaandrager 
Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University 
Nijmegen P.O. Box 9010, 6500 GL Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
Model-based system development is becoming an increasingly important driving force in the 
software and hardware industry. The construction of models typically requires specialized 
expertise, is time consuming and involves significant manual effort, implying that in practice 
often models are not available, or become outdated as the system evolves. In practice, 80% of 
software development involves legacy code, for which only poor documentation is available. 
Manual construction of models of legacy components is typically very labor intensive and often 
not cost effective. The solution is to infer models automatically through observations and test, 
that is, through black-box reverse engineering. 
The problem to build a state machine model of a system by providing inputs to it and observing 
the resulting outputs, often referred to as black-box system identification, is both fundamental 
and of clear practical interest. A major challenge is to let computers perform this task in a 
rigorous manner for systems with large numbers of states. 
The problem of learning state machines (automata) has been studied for decades. Many 
techniques for constructing models from observation of component behavior have been 
proposed. The most efficient such techniques use the setup of active learning, where a model of 
a system is learned by actively performing experiments on that system. 
Tools that are able to infer state machine models automatically by systematically “pushing 
buttons” and recording outputs have numerous applications in different domains. They support 
understanding and analyzing legacy software, regression testing of software components, 
protocol conformance testing based on reference implementations, reverse engineering of 
proprietary/classified protocols, and inference of botnet protocols. 
LearnLib [7], the winner of the 2010 Zulu competition on regular inference, is currently able to 
learn state machines with at most in the order of 10.000 states. During the last few years 
important developments have taken place on the borderline of verification, model-based testing 
and automata learning. By combining ideas from these three areas it will become possible to 
learn models of realistic software components with state-spaces that are many orders of 
magnitude larger than what state-of-the-art tools can currently handle. 
Clearly, abstraction is the key for scaling existing automata learning methods to realistic 
applications. The idea of an intermediate component that takes care of abstraction is very 
natural and is used, implicitly or explicitly, in many case studies on automata learning. Aarts, 
Jonsson and Uijen [3] formalized the concept of such an intermediate abstraction component. 
Inspired by ideas from predicate abstraction, they defined the notion of a mapper A, which is 
placed in between the SUT M and the learner, and transforms the interface of the SUT by an 
abstraction that maps (in a history dependent manner) the large set of actions of the SUT into a 
small set of abstract actions. By combining the abstract machine H learned in this way with 
information about the mapper A, they can effectively learn a (symbolically represented) state 
machine that is equivalent to M. Roughly speaking, the learner is responsible for learning the 
global “control modes” in which the system can be, and the transitions between those modes, 
whereas the mapper records some relevant state variables (typically computed from the data 
parameters of previous input and output actions) and takes care of the data part of the SUT. 
A major challenge will be the development of algorithms for the automatic construction of 
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mappers: the availability of such algorithms will boost the applicability of automata learning 
technology. In [2], we provided a solid theoretical foundation for a generalization of the 
abstraction framework of [3]. The theory of [2] is (a) based on interface and I/O automata 
instead of the more restricted Mealy machines (in which each input induces exactly one output), 
(b) supports the concept of a learning purpose, which allows us to restrict the learning process 
to relevant interaction patterns only, and (c) supports a richer class of abstractions. 
In [1], we presented our prototype tool Tomte, named after the creature that shrank Nils 
Holgersson into a gnome and (after numerous adventures) changed him back to his normal size 
again. Tomte is able to automatically construct mappers for a restricted class of scalarset 
automata, in which one can test for equality of data parameters, but no operations on data are 
allowed. The notion of a scalarset data type originates from model checking, where it is been 
used by Ip & Dill for symmetry reduction [6]. We use the technique of counterexample-guided 
abstraction refinement: initially, the algorithm starts with a very course abstraction A, which is 
subsequently refined if it turns out that M∥A is not behavior-deterministic. 
Non-determinism arises naturally when we apply abstraction: it may occur that the behavior of a 
SUT is fully deterministic but that due to the mapper (which, for instance, abstracts from the 
precise value of certain input parameters), the system appears to behave non-deterministically 
from the perspective of the learner. We used LearnLib as our basic learning tool and therefore 
the abstraction of the SUT may not exhibit any non-determinism: if it does then LearnLib 
crashes and we have to refine the abstraction. This is exactly what has been done repeatedly 
during the manual construction of the abstraction mappings in the case studies of [3]. We 
formalized this procedure and described the construction of the mapper in terms of a 
counterexample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) procedure, similar to the approach 
developed by Clarke et al [4] in the context of model checking. 
Using Tomte, we have succeeded to learn fully automatically models of several realistic 
software components, including the biometric passport, the SIP protocol and the various 
components of the Alternating Bit Protocol. 
The Tomte tool and all the models that we used in our experiments are available via 
http://www.italia.cs.ru.nl/. Table 1 gives an overview of the systems we learned with the 
number of input refinement steps, total learning and testing queries, number of states of the 
learned abstract model, and time needed for learning and testing (in seconds). For example, the 
learned SIP model is an extended finite state machine with 29 states, 3741 transitions, and 17 
state variables with various types (booleans, enumerated types, (long) integers, character 
strings,..). This corresponds to a state machine with an astronomical number of states and 
transitions, thus far fully out of reach of automata learning techniques. We have checked that all 
models inferred are bisimilar to their SUT. For this purpose we combined the learned model 
with the abstraction and used the CADP tool set, http://www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/cadp/, for 
equivalence checking. 
 
System under test Input 
refinements 
Learning/ 
Testing queries 
States Learning/Testing 
time 
Alternating Bit Protocol - Sender 1 193/3001 7 1.3s/104.9s 
Alternating Bit Protocol - Receiver 2 145/3002 4 0.9s/134.5s 
Alternating Bit Protocol - Channel 0 31/3000 2 0.3s/107.5s 
Biometric Passport 3 2199/3582 5 7.7s/94.5s 
Session Initiation Protocol 3 1755/3402 13 8.3s/35.9s 
Login 3 639/3063 5 2.0s/56.8s 
Farmer-Wolf-Goat-Cabbage Puzzle 4 699/3467 10 4.4s/121.8s 
Palindrome/Repdigit Checker 11 3461/3293 1 10.3s/256.4s 
Table 1. Learning statistics  
 
Currently, Tomte can learn SUTs that may only remember the last and first occurrence of a 
parameter. We expect that it will be relatively easy to dispose of this restriction. We also expect 
that our CEGAR based approach can be further extended to systems that may apply simple or 
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known operations on data, using technology for automatic detection likely invariants, such as 
Daikon [5]. Even though the class of systems to which our approach currently applies is limited, 
the fact that we are able to learn models of systems with data fully automatically is a major step 
towards a practically useful technology for automatic learning of models of software 
components.  
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Managing the co-evolution of software artifacts  
J.M.A.M. Gabrielsa, D.H.R. Holtenb, M.D. Klabbersa,  
W.J.P. van Ravensteijnb, A. Serebrenikc 
 
aLaboratory for Quality Software, Eindhoven University of Technology 
bSynerScope B.V. 
cModel-Driven Software Engineering, Eindhoven University of Technology. 
 
 
 
 
Software development projects are virtually always carried out under pressure. Planning and 
budgets are tight, room for errors is non-existent and the pressure to deliver is high. Natural 
questions for (test) managers arise, such as: “When have we tested enough?” and “How many 
tests do we have to redo for this new version?'”. The naive answer would be: “when we have 
convinced ourselves through testing that all requirements are satisfied”. Unfortunately, attaining 
maximal confidence with minimal effort is not easy. 
 
In order to convince ourselves that the system does what it is supposed to do, tests are needed. 
Requirements, design and code change during the development of software. As a consequence, 
tests need to change as well. In the end we want to ensure that all requirements and risks are 
adequately addressed with tests. For this, tests at different levels of abstraction and for different 
software artifacts are required and need to be managed. 
 
Traceability matrices are often used to relate user requirements, design, code, and tests. 
Traceability allows to link elements from different software artifacts, like requirements, design 
components and code components, to each other and to test cases. As a result, traceability can 
be used to analyze for example how well software artifacts are covered by test cases. Because a 
requirement leads to design components and eventually to code, tests are needed at each stage. 
Traceability can tell us how well test cases cover different software artifact elements. This 
information can be used to uncover mistakes in software artifacts at an early stage and actively 
manage the development and test efforts. Unfortunately, traceability information is often spread 
out over multiple artifacts and describes only the current situation. 
 
TraceVis, a visual analytics tool based on the master thesis of Van Ravensteijn1 combines the 
traceability information of multiple software artifacts in an interactive way. The tool was 
recently applied to fraud detection in financial transactions 2  and software model 
transformations3, Figure 1 shows the traceability between four, vertically placed, hierarchical 
software artifacts: acceptance test plan (ATP), user requirements document (URD), software 
requirements document (SRD), and architectural design document (ADD). Hierarchy within 
each document is given by its division into chapters, sections and subsections. Each line 
between hierarchies represents a link between elements of two artifacts, e.g., user requirement 
being tested by an acceptance test or architectural component implementing a software 
requirement. The hierarchies can be collapsed and extended and risk levels and priorities can be 
                                                      
1 W.J.P. van Ravensteijn, Visual traceability across dynamic ordered hierarchies, M.Sc. thesis, 2011, 
Eindhoven University of Technology 
2 SynerScope on-line demos: http://www.synerscope.com/demos, and, specifically, SynerScope for Fraud 
http://www.synerscope.com/content/SynerScope%20for%20Fraud1.pdf 
3  M.F. van Amstel, A. Serebrenik, & M.G.J. van den Brand, Visualizing traceability in model 
transformation compositions, 2011, Workshop on Composition and Evolution of Model Transformations,  
London: Department of Informatics, King's College London. 
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visualized by giving the elements different colors. The edge bundling technique bundles similar 
relations in the middle, clearly showing deviations. Furthermore, TraceVis provides a way of 
assessing the evolution of traceability between artifacts though a timeline (lower part of Figure 
1). The timeline shows such events as addition, modification or removal of individual elements, 
e.g., user requirements or tests, as well as addition or removal of traceability links between the 
elements. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: TraceVis tool with traceability information from a student capstone project at the 
Eindhoven University of Technology. The edge bundeling technique makes it easy to spot 
deviations.  
 
Already at first glance, we can see points of attention in Figure 1: a gap in requirement coverage 
(1) and a gap in the timeline (2). The gap labeled (1) shows some medium and low priority user 
requirements not covered by acceptance tests. The gap labeled (2), located in the timeline, 
shows that test cases were added very late in the project. The gap itself relates to 
implementation activities in which there were no changes to the shown software artifacts. 
 
By interactively inspecting the traceability information, we can discover points of interest. 
Figure 1 reveals, for example, that a selected user requirement (URC8) is tested by one 
acceptance test, corresponds to one software requirement and is implemented in one 
architectural component. While this does not seem to be problematic, further inspection of the 
evolution of user requirements closely related to URC8 tells an entirely different story. While 
grouped together in the URD, the corresponding software requirements are spread all over the 
SRD, and implementation involves five out of thirteen architectural components.  
 
Figure 1 also shows outliers; grey lines running off-center between the URD and the SRD (3), 
and between the SRD and the ADD. The core part of the SRD consists of two parts: 
Requirements and Rights table. The Requirements part consists of Functional requirements 
further divided in groups (with 189 requirements in total) and Non-functional requirements (1 
requirement). The Rights table part contains only one element, i.e., the rights table. This means 
that individual functional requirements are nested at depth four, the non-functional requirements 
at depth three and the rights table at depth two. Therefore the rights table is an “outlier” in the 
organization of the SRD. 
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The evolutionary traceability information allows us to see how well tests cover artifacts and 
whether risks are sufficiently tackled. It gives insight in the balance between tests, priorities, 
and risks and can support decision making in assigning test effort. Furthermore, it can help in 
determining which tests need to be redone when a certain component or requirement changes. 
The insight in the co-evolution of software artifacts and associated tests makes it possible to 
actively manage test effort from an early stage on. 
About the authors 
Joost Gabriels (j.m.a.m.gabriels@tue.nl) received his M.Sc. in Computer Science from the 
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Risk Based Testing. A piece of cake or not? 
Jeanne Hofmans 
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Risk based testing has been a popular approach to testing for a while. Based on the fact that it is 
impossible to test everything, the idea of focusing test effort on the most risky areas has been 
embraced by both testers and management. But even today many companies and projects are 
struggling with their risk based test approach. Especially since systems under test are becoming 
more complex the need to focus on the risky areas increases. And thus the need for a flexible 
and practical approach for identifying and managing risks. This article is about popular risk 
methods, their pitfalls and introduces a practical approach to risk based testing.  
1. Product Risk Analysis 
An important task in risk based testing is the product risk analysis (PRA). Product risk analysis 
is a method to identify and analyze risks. A risk is a factor that could have a negative 
consequence in the future and is usually expressed as impact and likelihood (ISTQB).  
 
In testing one should focus on risks with high impact and likelihood. Risks with an extremely 
high impact should have more focus than risks with low impact. This does not mean that no 
effort is spent on other risks with a lower impact. It only means that less effort is spent.   
2. Common PRA-methods 
Several methods for product risk analysis exist. Popular methods are PRISMA®, PRIMA®, the 
risk method of TMAP Next® and the Failure Mode, Effect & Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  
 
Methods like PRIMA® and the risk method of TMAP NEXT® divide the system under test in 
risk areas in which certain quality attributes are important. In the TMAP NEXT® risk analysis 
several other tables are constructed to determine the risk of smaller system components. This is 
done to make the risk concerned with certain quality attributes and both systems and 
components clear. The risk factor determines the test effort per component.  
 
The PRISMA® method does not prescribe how to categorize risks, it is a method to identify risk 
quadrants, like shown in figure 1. Often it is used as a specification-based method in which each 
(part of the) specification represents a risk item. Each risk item is to be assigned a risk quadrant.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Four Risk quadrants as used in the PRISMA-method 
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In a Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis a complete fault three is made to determine 
failure modes that could have a negative effect on a predefined top event. This is preferably 
done in the design stage in which the design can be altered, based on results of the FMECA. 
3. Pitfalls using common PRA-methods 
Fully applying a FMECA is very time-consuming. This is primarily done for high-risk systems 
like aircrafts. A solution is to only use FMECA for a risky part of the system. 
 
TMAP Next® and PRIMA® give stakeholders and managers good insight in the high-risk areas 
of a system. However the resulting PRA is often not used by test engineers when deciding what 
to test and what not to test. Perhaps the PRA does not match the available specifications 
because the PRA is based on subsystems whilst the specification is function-based. Or perhaps 
the test engineer does not understand all the tables that are delivered in the risk analysis method 
TMAP Next®. It then becomes hard for a test engineer to test based on risks. In best case the 
information provided is used by the test manager as a checklist to see if nothing is missing in 
the current test set. In worst case the PRA is not used at all. 
 
Using PRISMA® in a specification-based manner overcomes the problem of the PRA not being 
a practical source for test engineers. If chosen wisely the risk items in the PRA represent 
(sections of) the specifications. As testers use the specifications as a starting-point for testing it 
helps when the PRA simply states which parts represent the highest risk. The pitfall in this is 
that PRISMA® is only used in such a specification based manner. If test cases are only based 
on specifications, likely not all risks are covered. 
4. A practical approach for Product Risk Analysis 
 A practical rule of thumb is to base the product risk analysis on three types of product risk:  
 
• Specification; 
• Integral; 
• Regression.  
 
These three types of product risk are very much in line with the way testers (should ) test. First 
of all the specification is tested, where more attention is paid to the parts which are identified as 
most risky. Then special attention is paid to risks that exist, but are not clear in the specification; 
the integral (or implicit) risks. Finally attention must be paid to the approach for regression 
testing.  
 
For a system test, the specification and thus PRA can be based on functions or use cases. For an 
interface test the PRA and specification can be based on interfaces (per Interface Requirement 
Specification or for each interface in an Interface Requirement Specification). For a 
maintenance test the specification and thus PRA can consist of change reports. For a regression 
test, the set of existing test cases can be input to the PRA. 
 
This rule of thumb, identifying three types of product risk, can very well be used in combination 
with PRISMA®. In this case a PRA is made for each test level. Some test levels can share a 
PRA if they share the same specifications or are highly related and traceable. For identifying 
integral or implicit risks brainstorm sessions, stakeholder interviews or FMECA’s can be used. 
A FMECA can be done for even a complete system, but can also very well be applied to some 
function or subsystem. PRIMA® and the first part of the risk method of TMAP Next® can be 
useful to give an total, more static overview of the risky areas of the system. The PRA per test 
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level will be used more intensively, as they represents a testers day-to-day’s business. That is 
testing according to specs, testing the relevant risks and regression testing. 
5. Product Risk Process 
The most important thing to be said about the process of risk based testing is that it all depends 
on how well risks are being kept track of. Most of all this requires a lot of discipline. However 
when defining product risks in terms of three types (specification, integral and regression) this 
can very easily be translated to the test strategy of a test level. In a test level first the 
specification-based risks are covered, then or in parallel the integral risks and finally regression 
tests take place.  
 
The discipline is in constantly keeping track of the status of existing risks and identifying new 
risks. It is easier to keep track of the status of risks when defining three types of product risk. At 
least, if using an accompanying test strategy… 
 
The reward is that stakeholders and management become more involved. Involvement grows as 
they better understand what testers actually do and how testers can be helped to let the project 
deliver a system that supports the stakeholders and users in their needs .  
6. Conclusion 
The basic concept of risk based testing is still embraced by many testers, managers en 
stakeholders. If used properly it should direct testing in an efficient manner. Unfortunately very 
often risk based testing is not a piece of cake. In this article I discussed common methods for  
product risk analysis (PRA), and possible reasons why projects struggle. In worst case a PRA 
becomes shelfware.  
 
In general it is smart to use a combination of risk analysis techniques like FMECA, a 
brainstorm, PRISMA, etc. In this way risks are determined using different viewpoints. These 
viewpoints are also represented in the three types of risk identified in this article: Specification, 
Integral and Regression. The strength of identifying tree types of product risk is that it is both 
understandable for a stakeholder and usable for a tester.  
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Modern application landscapes are becoming more and more interconnected. The introduction 
of SOA and ESB technology has increased the dependency on other systems, both internal and 
external. This has severe consequences for testing SOA applications, their availability, and the 
constraints on different environments. 
1. Testing challenges of service-oriented systems 
On March 11, 2009, twenty-five residents of a little municipality in the West of the Netherlands 
unexpectedly received a certificate that they were married or had registered a newborn. What 
happened? To test the central information system of the country, data in the central people 
registry had been modified. While the data was supposed to be only a test for the system, it 
ended up updating the real population database and initiating the processes for informing the 
involved citizens. In fact, the change propagated even further: from the central population 
registry, it also affected the information system of the tax office and of the retirement 
administration.  
This anecdote illustrates the challenges faced in testing service-oriented systems. From the 
perspective of a tester, most of the challenges arise from the need to prepare and execute tests in 
the shortest possible amount of time and without dependency on other processes. In order to 
work independently of other processes, dependencies such as dependency on availability of 
testing environment or dependency caused by sharing resources with others must be removed. 
Moreover, testers must start preparation of test scripts before a code that they will test is written. 
One of the reasons for this is that many software companies are working per Agile working 
methodology, which means that iterations in which developers and testers need to deliver an 
additional value to a software are much shorter. If testers could start the preparation of test 
scripts from day one of the sprint, their chances to prepare tests on time would significantly 
increase. In addition, testers usually have difficulties to produce all desired states of the external 
services that are part of their chain testing. In order to cover all code paths and to ensure that the 
system is fully functional, tester needs to have ability to mock-up some of the services or, in 
other words, simulate desired behavior of external services. Furthermore, external services can 
be available just for a limited time or not available at all.  
From the perspective of a company, besides quality of a software, major concerns are additional 
costs. These costs can be caused by acquiring additional equipment or human resources. Even 
higher additional costs lie in maintenance work that was unnecessary or in project delays which 
occurred. Such additional costs need to be reduced or if possible totally eliminated. 
In short, all the above-mentioned issues point to the same goal: to increase the speed of a testing 
process and that way reduce the costs by removing dependencies and gaining the control over 
testing environments. Most of above-mentioned issues could be avoided if a simulation 
environment, behaving in the very same way as a real system, is used. Nowadays, generation of 
this kind of simulation environment is very feasible and will be further discussed in this paper. 
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2. The solution is in a virtualization 
The facts are that software is continuously evolving and that in service-oriented systems the 
functionality is spread across the network. However, testing of software still implicitly assumes 
full control over a system. The reality is that the service under test depends on the service 
provided by external services (which are not owned by the subject performing testing) in order 
to provide its own service. 
In this work we propose that simulation environments should be semi-automatically generated 
and thus gain control over external services and their data. Why? 
As a part of integration testing, different 
versions of interdependent services need to 
be tested together as one system, in order to 
confirm that all functional aspects for this 
particular combination of services are 
covered. To prove this, data that is stored in 
each system need to be appropriate, so all 
important test cases can be executed. If 
external systems are not owned by us, 
which is usually the case, tests can be 
performed only with data that is available. 
Alternatively, virtual assets that mimic a 
behavior of external services can be 
created. A set of this kind of virtual assets, 
representing all external systems, would 
form a simulation environment. It is 
possible to generate this kind of environment by using currently available tools. Stubs or mock 
services are not something new, and nowadays they can be easily generated just by having a 
WSDL, log file or by some other way. Once virtual assets are generated/deployed, the behavior 
of the external service methods needs to be modeled. To make it even easier, only the behavior 
of certain methods which are needed in order to cover defined test cases needs to be modeled. 
Thus careful choice of the test cases permits saving time and resources. Behavior of a services 
can be modeled simply by defining expected outputs for certain inputs. However, this is not that 
simple for services that preserve a state. Examples of these kinds of service methods are ones 
that do not have input parameters but need to return an output (for example createAccount 
method). For this kind of method, it is difficult to map a set of inputs to set a set of outputs. 
Besides generation of the simulation environment, the whole ecosystem should be populated 
with corresponding test-data. This procedure should be carried out only one time. After we have 
prepared environments that are populated with data that describe their behavior, real tests can be 
executed on the system under test. During execution, simulated external services return 
responses that are exactly the same as those that would be returned by real external services. 
Thus the creation of simulated systems, which can be easily maintained without a need for 
intervention of environment administrators, solves the problems of availability, dependency, 
and maintenance. 
3. WMO case study 
In order to demonstrate how this procedure could 
work in practice, we present a simulation 
environment of a real business process for the 
implementation of the Wet Maatschappelijke 
Ondersteuning Law (WMO). The WMO is a Dutch 
law for supporting people that have a chronic disease 
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or disability, so that these people can independently live in their homes and actively take part in 
everyday life despite their physical limitations. The support that is provided by the WMO 
typically includes transportation, a wheelchair, or a home modification (e.g. removing doorposts 
for people using wheelchairs). The responsibility for a WMO request lies with the Dutch 
municipalities; they handle the complete business process. The process accesses external 
parties, e.g., insurance companies and doctors for medical advice. In the WMO ecosystem, all 
of the issues mentioned in section 2 can be seen. External services such as “Medical doctor” are 
not available all the time and especially not available for sending test-data which would pollute 
the real database or send notifications to the real doctors. Furthermore, in case of testing a 
“Municipality” service, a system engineer would need to deploy the latest version of the 
external services code on test environments. Firstly, we may not have access to that code that is 
external to our organization. Secondly, we would depend on some other team (i.e. Ops team) for 
deployment. And thirdly, the testing environment might not be available. All of these issues can 
be avoided simulating all external services and modeling their desired behavior. 
For this paper, we have used the Parasoft Virtualize tool to create virtual assets which would 
represent all three external services (Medical doctor, Insurance company, Care supplier). 
“Citizen” was simulated by Parasoft SOAtest, which we used to send the requests to the 
“Municipality” service. We have thus demonstrated that it is possible to create all needed 
components by using currently available tools. We have also modeled virtual assets’ behavior to 
cover basic scenarios and recorded desired requests and responses. The next step would be to 
find a way to semi-automatically generate all those virtual assets, populate them with the data 
and keep up-to-date. 
As this was in a way a toy example, now we are approaching companies for appropriate systems 
that could be used as the real case study. We are aware that we have just scratched the top of the 
iceberg. Our goal is to have Agile support for a TestOps team which would enable simple 
switching between staged environments by merging testing and infrastructure knowledge.  
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Successful UI Test Automation 
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In an IT world of constant change, shorter release cycles, iterative development processes, and 
increasing complexity of enterprise applications, testing is a business-critical step in the 
Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). Automation of testing processes is a must-have for 
organizations that plan to remain competitive as these changes will continue to accelerate and 
further influence software development. 
 
Building a successful test automation practice is a challenging task for many development 
organizations. Mature development organizations realize that simple UI test automation 
techniques like record/playback do not provide the ROI required for modern development 
projects. 
 
Keyword-driven Testing (KDT) is a widely accepted test automation technique that many 
mature development organizations rely on to overcome the disadvantages of simple 
record/playback test automation. However beyond the advantages that KDT frameworks 
deliver, there are major disadvantages in manageability and complexity inherent in KDT. Many 
applications require that thousands of automation keywords be developed to make use of KDT. 
Navigating and constructing test cases based on these keywords can be cumbersome and 
unpractical. 
 
Acceptance Testing Frameworks (ATF) such as FitNesse use a similar approach to structuring 
test cases (acceptance tests) using keywords that are implemented using coded fixtures. These 
frameworks do not support users in navigating all available actions (keywords). As with KDT 
frameworks, ATFs do not support developers in structuring fixtures (the implementation of the 
actions) so that they can be easily reused and maintained. 
 
State-driven Testing (SDT) addresses the maintenance and complexity issues of KDT by 
providing a UI state-transition model. By defining state transitions of the user interface, the set 
of allowable UI actions (keywords) at any given point in a test case is reduced from thousands 
of allowable actions down to a manageable list of tens of allowable actions. SDT uses a domain 
specific language (DSL) to define the test automation framework which provides a highly 
maintainable and simple approach to structuring a test framework. 
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